We discover a consumption channel of monetary policy in a model with money and government bonds. When the central bank withdraws government bonds (short-term or long-term) through open market operations, it lowers returns on bonds. The lower return has a direct negative impact on consumption by households that hold bonds, and an indirect negative impact on consumption by households that hold money. As a result, …rms earn less pro…ts from production, which leads to higher unemployment. The existence of such a consumption channel can help us understand the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy.
Introduction
We develop a model with money and government bonds to study how a change in the supply of government bonds through open market operations (OMOs) a¤ects consumption and unemployment through a consumption channel. Conventional monetary policy generally targets some short-term interest rates by conducting OMOs.
During the recent Great Recession, targeted short-term interest rates in several advanced economies have been cut close to zero. 1 This limits a central bank's ability to further lower the short-term interest rate to stimulate the economy. Instead of targeting short-term interest rates, the central banks of the US, Japan and some European countries all conducted unconventional monetary policy by either purchasing long-term government bonds or other government-guaranteed private securities in …-nancial markets. The goal is to directly lower long-term interest rates in …nancial
markets.
An important feature of conventional and unconventional monetary policy is that they are essentially about adjusting the supply of government bonds through OMOs.
Hence, it is necessary for a model to have money and bonds in order to understand the e¤ects of such policy. A few recent papers in monetary theory including Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2017) consider multiple assets, but most of these models do not have unemployment. Given that one of the US Federal Reserve's mandated objectives is the achievement of "full employment," we integrate a labor market model with genuine unemployment into a microfounded monetary model with multiple assets. 1 In 2008, the US Federal Reserve cut the Federal Fund Rate to zero. This zero-lower-bound problem is also observed in Japan and various European countries. In Japan, as early as in 1995, the Bank of Japan cut the short-term interest rate almost to zero, which lasted until 2016. After the Great Recession, the European Central Bank cut the short-term target rate to zero.
There are two key elements of our model. The …rst is that money and bonds are valued by households because they can facilitate transactions in the goods market.
The coexistence of money and bonds makes the model suitable to consider OMOs as central bank's swaps of government bonds and money. Monetary policy can a¤ect households'portfolio decisions if the policy changes the relative return of these assets.
The second key element is that the labor and goods markets are connected. Firms bring production from the labor market for sale in the goods market. Households can purchase goods for consumption in the goods market using money or government bonds. This link between the labor and goods markets provides a channel through which monetary policy a¤ects unemployment.
Our model builds on Berentsen et al. (2011) . We …rst add short-term government bonds in addition to money. In such an environment, the central bank can adjust the supply of short-term bonds as a monetary policy instrument, i.e., OMOs. We …nd that di¤erent cases of monetary equilibrium exist depending on the relative supply of short-term bonds. OMOs can a¤ect the economy only when the supply of bonds is scarce, but not too scarce. In this case, the return on bonds is higher than that on money. Households that have access to bonds use only bonds to trade in the goods market, and households that do not have access to bonds use money. When the central bank reduces the supply of government bonds by purchasing bonds, the price of bonds increases and the short-term interest rate decreases. For households that use bonds, the lower interest rate directly induces them to hold fewer bonds and consume less. As a result, …rms'pro…ts from selling to these households decrease. In the labor market, lower pro…ts discourage …rms from entering and raise unemployment. In the goods market, households face fewer trading opportunities and this will lower the marginal bene…t of holding money. This general equilibrium e¤ect indirectly makes households that use money hold less money and consume less, which further lowers …rms'pro…ts and raises unemployment.
We focus on the e¤ects of OMOs through a consumption channel. That is, the change in the supply of bonds a¤ects the return on bonds and consumption by bond holders in the goods market. This in turn can a¤ect labor market outcomes, which further a¤ects the return from holding money. Therefore, real balances also respond to OMOs. Our model provides a clear transmission channel of OMOs to the real side of the macroeconomy. A permanent decrease in the supply of government bonds has a negative impact on employment. The conventional view is that a central bank's purchase of government bonds would lower interest rates and thus stimulate investment. Our model does not have this investment channel. As this investment channel has been identi…ed in recent studies such as Rocheteau and Rodriguez-lopez (2014), we argue that the consumption channel is complementary to the investment channel.
During the Great Recession, several central banks choose to purchase long-term government bonds or other government-guaranteed private securities. To address the e¤ects of this unconventional policy, we extend the basic model by adding longterm government bonds. We consider the long run e¤ects of unconventional policy where the central bank changes the supply of long-term government bonds. When the short-term interest rate is close to zero, the central bank can buy or sell longterm government bonds to directly adjust the long-term interest rate. Through the consumption channel, unconventional policy lowers the long-term interest rate and households'consumption. As a result, equilibrium unemployment increases. We …nd that a positive lower bound on the long-term interest rate exists because long-term bonds are less liquid than short-term bonds.
We contribute to the monetary theory literature by providing a framework to analyze how monetary policy especially OMOs a¤ects unemployment. We …nd that OMOs may not a¤ect consumption and unemployment when the supply of government bonds is either too low or too high. When OMOs have a real e¤ect, the consumption channel indicates that the central bank's withdrawal of either short-term or long-term government bonds lowers consumption and raises unemployment. Moreover, there exists a positive lower bound on the long-term interest rate if a central bank changes the supply of long-term bonds.
Our paper is related to two broad lines of literature. The …rst line uses search and matching theory to integrate the goods and labor markets. In Berentsen et al. (2011) and Bethune et al. (2015) , a medium of exchange is essential to facilitate transactions in the goods market. Monetary policy is modeled as adjusting the growth rate of money supply. These models provide implications on the e¤ects of monetary policy on unemployment. We introduce government bonds so that we can consider OMOs as an alternative monetary policy tool.
There is also a recent growing literature that studies the interaction between the product and labor markets. For example, Kaplan and Menzio (2016) show how multiple equilibria arise when employed workers and unemployed workers have di¤erent shopping patterns. They …nd that high unemployment can be a self-ful…lling outcome.
See also Bai et al. (2017) and Hall (2017) . Relative to this literature, we introduce money and bonds into the product market in order to address how monetary policy a¤ects the interaction between the goods and labor markets.
The second line of research involves microfounded models of assets and liquidity. Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2017) are most closely related to our paper. Rocheteau and Rodriguez-lopez (2014) build a model with an over-the-counter …nancial market and a labor market. The model includes various types of assets with di¤erent acceptability, i.e., money, government bonds and private assets, and distinguishes public and private liquidity. The main result is that an increase in public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real interest rate, crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment. The main theme is closely related to our paper, but they focus on the investment channel of monetary policy by showing how monetary policy lowers the interest rate and stimulates investment demand. Wen (2013) and Herrenbrueck (2013) develop models to understand unconventional monetary policy. They calibrate to the US data and …nd that unconventional policy can e¤ectively stimulate investment under certain conditions. In their models, there is no explicit unemployment because production occurs in competitive markets. CIA models, and they focus on the short-run e¤ects of OMOs. We abstract from any short-run e¤ects of OMOs and focus on the long-run e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model's environment. Section 3 introduces the basic model. Section 4 characterizes monetary equilibria and analyzes the e¤ects of OMOs. Section 5 focuses on unconventional monetary policy by extending the basic model to incorporate long-term government bonds. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs and detailed derivations can be found in the Appendix.
Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. As in Berentsen et al. (2011) , there are three subperiods in each period: there is a search and matching labor market in the …rst subperiod; a decentralized goods market in the second subperiod; and a frictionless centralized market in the last subperiod. We refer to these markets as labor, goods and centralized markets hereafter. There are two types of agents: …rms and households, indexed by f and h. 2 The measure of households is 1, while the measure of …rms is arbitrarily large, but not all …rms are active. In addition, there exists a government which is a consolidated …scal and monetary authority. All government asset transactions take place in the centralized market.
In the …rst subperiod, unemployed households and vacant …rms search and match bilaterally to create a job. Let e = 1 if a household and a …rm are matched, and In the goods market, the roles of households and …rms create the double coincidence problem. Since households cannot store any good, barter is impossible. Lack of commitment and lack of record-keeping imply that pure credit is not viable in the goods market. These frictions make assets essential as a medium of exchange to facilitate trade. We assume that there are two permanent types of households, depending on whether households can use bonds in the goods market. A fraction ! of households can use only money, whom we label as type-1 households, i.e., h = 1. The remaining fraction, 1 !; of households can use both money and bonds. 3 We label these households as type-2 households, i.e., h = 2. We can view type-2 households as those who have access to …nancial assets.
All agents can enter the centralized market in the last subperiod, where a numeraire good x is produced and traded in this competitive market. We assume that this numeraire good is nonstorable. A household's utility from consuming x units of the numeraire goods is x. If x is negative, it means that households produce x.
This linear utility makes households'asset portfolios tractable. Firms with e = 1 sell inventory (if c (q) < y ), rebalance asset portfolios and pay wages and dividends to households. 4 Firms with e = 0 can choose to create a new vacancy at a cost k. All agents discount between the centralized market and the next labor market at rate .
The government is active only in the centralized market. In the benchmark model, the government issues money and short-term government bonds. It can also adjust the supply of short-term bonds through OMOs. Let M t be the money supply measured in the beginning of the period t. The net growth rate of the money supply is . Shortterm bonds are one-period nominal bonds. Bonds that are issued at some discount price in period t would pay 1 unit of money in period t + 1. Let B t be the supply of bonds in period t. We focus on the steady states from now on, so we drop the time 3 We model the liquidity di¤erence between money and bonds through their roles as a medium of exchange. Money is more liquid than bonds as money can be used by all households, while only type-2 households can use bonds. Alternatively, one can model the liquidity di¤erence between money and bonds through their roles as collateral (See Rocheteau et al., 2017) . In that way, shortterm bonds are less liquid as a collateral asset than money and long-term bonds are less liquid as a collateral asset than short-term bonds. We use the …rst interpretation in this paper for simplicity. 4 
Model
The value functions for the labor, goods and centralized markets are U respectively, where j 2 f1; 2; f g and e 2 f0; 1g. We begin with the value functions for households and …rms in the centralized market, and then move to the following labor and goods markets.
Households
A household entering the centralized market with type j 2 f1; 2g, employment status where is the value of leisure. The LHS of the budget constraint is total expenditure, which includes the consumption of x, the value of money and bonds carried to next period, and taxes T . The RHS is total income, which includes wage w or unemploy-ment bene…t , …rms'dividends , and the value of money and bonds. Notice that the value of b s in terms of x is m b s as 1 unit bond pays 1 unit money at maturity.
The value ofb s in terms of x is sbs as new bonds are issued at the price s .
Substituting x from the budget constraint into the value function, we obtain For a household in the following labor market,
where h is the endogenous job creation rate. Let (u; v) denote the measures of unemployed households and vacancies. The matching function N (u; v) exhibits constant returns scale. We have h = N (u; v)=u = N (1; ), where = v=u is the labor market tightness.
Moving to the goods market, households become buyers while …rms with e = 1 become sellers. Each household is matched randomly with a …rm. Given that the measure of households is 1 and the measure of …rms with e = 1 is 1 u, the matching function is M (1; 1 u) ; which also has constant returns to scale. Recall that there are two types of households. Type-1 households can use only money to trade. Their value function is
where h = M (1; 1 u) is the household's probability of meeting a …rm and (q 
From (4), the choice of (m;b s ) is independent of e and (m; b s ). Hence, households of the same type take the same portfolio of money and bonds out of each centralized market.
Firms
Firms do not carry any money or bonds out of the centralized market since they would not use it in the subsequent markets. For a matched …rm with inventory , money balances m and short-term bonds b s , its value function in the centralized market is
As …rms do not carry any assets, we omit the state variables in U 
where f = N (u; v)=v = N (1; )= , is the endogenous job …lling rate. Only …rms with e = 1 produce y and participate in the subsequent goods market.
In the goods market, a …rm may meet a type-1 household or a type-2 household.
The …rm's value function is
where
1 (y; 0; 0) :
is the …rm's probability of trade. It costs a …rm c (q j )
units of goods produced in the labor market to sell q j units of goods for j 2 f1; 2g.
The …rm can carry the rest y c(q j ) as inventory to the subsequent centralized market.
Using the linearity of W
] is the …rm's expected surplus from trading in the goods market.
The free entry condition in the centralized market implies that …rms with e = 0 can choose to enter the centralized market by paying the entry cost k. Thus we have
and Pissarides (1994), we can derive
Recall that …rms pay out pro…ts as dividends in the centralized market. The aggregate pro…t by all …rms is (1 u)(y w + f S f ) vk. For a household that owns shares of all …rms, the dividend income is = (1 u)(y w + f S f ) vk.
Government
The government is a consolidated …scal and monetary authority. Without loss of generality, suppose that the government has a balanced budget in every period. The government budget constraint is
Here a subscript " " denotes variables associated with the previous period. The LHS of (7) shows total revenue, which includes the value of newly issued money and bonds plus tax revenue. The RHS represents total expenditure, which includes government purchases G, the value of previously issued government bonds and unemployment bene…ts.
The central bank can either adjust the growth rate of the money supply or the relative supply of money and bonds. Let s denote the ratio of short-term government bonds to money. The central bank commits to monetary policy where the money supply grows at 1 + , and the ratio of short-term bonds to money is s .
Mathematically, 
Equilibrium
The terms of trade in three markets are determined as follows: agents are price takers in the centralized market, and bargain over the terms of trade in the labor and goods markets. In this section, we solve for equilibrium conditions in all markets and de…ne a stationary monetary equilibrium. Then we use the model to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy.
Goods Market Equilibrium
A generic way to de…ne the bargaining solution is that for j 2 f1; 2g, a household pays g(q j ) in real terms to purchase q j units of goods, where g( ) depends on the speci…c bargaining protocol. 5 For example, the bargaining protocol could be Kalai bargaining or generalized Nash bargaining. Let denote the household's bargaining power. With Kalai bargaining, for the case d j =m and s =b s , we have,
where I j is an indicator, with I 1 = 0 and I 2 = 1. In case that either d j <m or s <b s , we have (9) and q j = q where q solves
For now, we use the general bargaining solution where the payment for exchanging q j units of goods is g(q j ). Note that another implicit constraint associated with the bargaining problem is c (q j ) y. It means that a …rm's supply of q j is restricted by y produced in the labor market. We assume that y is big enough so that this constraint never binds.
As in Lagos and Wright (2005) , the bargaining solution must be d 1 =m and q 1 = g 1 ( m+m ) for type-1 households. Given this, we move back to the centralized market and solve for (m;b s ) in (4) for type-1 households. The FOC with respect tô m yields
We use (q j ) = 0 (q j )=g 0 (q j ) 1 to denote the liquidity premium in a meeting with a type-j household. For type-2 households, they can use both money and bonds.
Notice that the return on bonds must be no lower than the return on money. When i s > 0, type-2 households would choosem = 0 and an interior solution forb s solves
, which we discuss in more detail later. In (10), i is the marginal cost of spending 1 more unit of money for type-1 households, while the RHS is the marginal bene…t of spending 1 more unit of money. Similarly, in (11), s s is the marginal cost of spending 1 more unit of short-term bonds for type-2 households, while the RHS is the marginal bene…t of spending 1 more unit of shortterm bonds. For any u, (10) and (11) determine (q 1 ; q 2 ). The labor and goods markets are linked: more unemployment reduces the number of …rms entering into the goods market and hence reduces the trading probability for households, which will further a¤ect equilibrium (q 1 ; q 2 ).
Labor Market Equilibrium
In the labor market, wage is determined by generalized Nash bargaining. Let be the bargaining power of a …rm. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we can solve for
Substituting (12) into (6), the free entry condition becomes
The ‡ow condition in the labor market implies that ( (13) is the expected surplus from trading with two types of households.
Equilibrium Allocation
In any monetary equilibrium, i s is endogenously determined given (i; s ). The noarbitrage condition implies that i s must not be lower than the nominal return of money (i.e., 0). In addition, i s cannot exceed i. Therefore, in equilibrium 0 i s i:
We now de…ne general equilibrium. When i > 0 and s is small, the equilibrium return on bonds is i s = 0: In this case, a scarce supply of bonds makes the price of bonds high. Money and bonds earn the same nominal return, 0, and become perfect substitutes for type-2 households.
The economy is in a liquidity trap. From (10) and (11), where
That is, when s is big enough, the supply of bonds is abundant and the return on bonds is high. We label this case as the plentiful bonds case.
When i > 0 and the value of s is neither too small nor too big, the equilibrium return i s is between 0 and i. The return on bonds is higher than that of money so that type-2 households would prefer to hold only bonds. Meanwhile, the return on bonds is not so high and type-2 households hold a …nite amount of bonds. The aggregate demand for bonds in real terms is 
The equilibrium allocation (q 1 ; q 2 ; i s ; u) is solved from (10), (11), (13), and (15). This case exists if and only if i > 0 and (1 !) =! < s < . Compared to the case with plentiful bonds, the supply of bonds is relatively scarce and the return on bonds is low. Therefore, we label this case as the scarce bonds case. We summarize these three cases of monetary equilibrium in the following proposition. It is more interesting to examine the e¤ects of adjusting the supply of bonds s .
Clearly, in both the liquidity trap case and the plentiful bonds case, changing s is irrelevant because it does not a¤ect the allocation. Only in the scarce bonds case is Proposition 3 Consider (i; s ) as monetary policy parameters: (1) the liquidity trap case: @q 1 =@i < 0; @q 2 =@i < 0; and @u=@i > 0; @q
(2) the scarce bonds case: @q 1 =@i < 0; @q 2 =@i < 0; and @u=@i > 0; @q 1 =@ s > 0; @q 2 =@ s > 0; and @u=@ s < 0; and (3) the plentiful bonds case: @q 1 =@i < 0; @q 2 =@i = 0; and @u=@i > 0; @q
In addition to the connection between the goods and labor markets, the other key assumption for our result is that both money and bonds are valued by households, but are not perfect substitutes. If money and bonds are perfect substitutes, then we would have the results as in Wallace (1981) that OMOs are neutral. We assume that two permanent types of households have access to di¤erent assets. In this way, money and bonds di¤er in terms of their liquidity properties and returns. We need type-1 households to ensure money is always valued. We also need type-2 households so that bonds are valued by some households. One can consider several other assumptions about households. For example, we can assume that households are homogeneous and can use bonds with some probability. There will be two types of meetings in the goods market depending on whether a household uses bonds. We can alternatively assume that households are homogeneous but can use bonds at a cost. This way essentially endogenizes !.
We choose to have two permanent types of households for several reasons. The …rst is that this assumption of permanent types delivers sharp analytical results that highlight the consumption channel of OMOs. While the consumption channel still exists using the other two assumptions, neither way can provide clean analytical results for the e¤ects of OMOs on unemployment. If households can use bonds with some probability 1 !, the same decrease in s would lead to a fall in q 2 . However, since households choose a portfolio of money and bonds before going to the goods market, the lower return on bonds raises the relative bene…t of using money, which makes households hold more money and q 1 increase. The overall e¤ect of s on u depends on the value of !. Our numerical example shows that a decrease in s raises unemployment when ! is low, but reduces unemployment when ! is high. If households can use bonds at a cost, there is an endogenous ! that makes households indi¤erent between using bonds and money. In equilibrium, a fraction ! of households use money and the rest use bonds. Since ! also depends on the value of s , it is less clear how s a¤ects consumption and unemployment, although our numerical example shows that a lower s leads to a higher u. We feel that having permanent types of households is the simplest model to deliver the consumption channel.
Another reason is that households in reality tend to be heterogeneous. As mentioned earlier, we view type-2 households as those who have access to …nancial assets. (2017) for a discussion of the liquidity trap case using permanent types of agents. In the section, we incorporate long-term government bonds to address the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy. 7 These long-term bonds are perpetual bonds (like Consols) that pay 1 unit of money in every future period.
Unconventional Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds i`and the spread s`are de…ned as
where `= m represents the nominal value of long-term bonds. Type-1 households can still use only money whereas type-2 households can use money and both types of bonds in the goods market. When traded in the goods market, we assume that long-term bonds are not as liquid as short-term bonds so that type-2 households can use only a fraction of their long-term bonds to buy goods. 8 The central bank can potentially change the relative supply of long-term bonds as its monetary policy parameter. Suppose that the central bank commits to
in addition to (8) . Now monetary policy parameters include (i; s ; `) .
We discuss the main characterization of the extended model and leave details about derivation in Appendix D. In the goods market, type-2 households can use any assets. When solving the bargaining problem, an additional asset constraint ` bè xists, which re ‡ects that the household can use only a fraction of long-term bonds in transactions. Type-2 households consume q whenever any of the asset constraints is not binding. If all asset constraints are binding, there is a FOC with respect tob`,
It is immediate from (11) and (18) that
For both short-term bonds and long-term bonds to be held by type-2 households, the spread of long-term bonds must be lower than the spread of short-term bonds. That is, long-term bonds must have a higher return than short-term bonds. This type of positive term premium is also found in Williamson (2013) bonds. Therefore, depending on the relative supply of long-term bonds, `, we have three cases which we show on the horizontal axis in Figure 2 . That is, when `i s small, i`= 0 and we have the liquidity trap case. When `i s big, the supply of long-term bonds is abundant so that i`= i. This is the plentiful bonds case. When Figure 2 illustrates the second subcase where the combination of ( s ; `) gives rise to 0 < i s < i`< i. Type-2 households strictly prefer to hold bonds, but are indi¤erent between the two types of bonds. When the supply of bonds is abundant as show in area 3, both bonds yield high returns and 0 < i s = i`= i. Here long-term bonds have the same return as short-term bonds. Type-2 households are indi¤erent between the two types of bonds because it is not costly to hold bonds.
A new case that is worth discussing is the equilibrium represented by area 2 in Figure 2 . It requires
Type-2 households hold a portfolio of short-term and long-term government bonds to use in the goods market. Therefore, g (q 2 ) = m+bs + ( m+ + `+ ) b`. The equilibrium conditions that characterize (q 1 ; q 2 ; s s ; s`; u) are (10), (13) , (18), (19) and
where (21) is derived from the asset market clearing conditions. Short-term bonds have a return premium because they are more liquid than long-term bonds.
Given that both i s and i`are positive, the central bank can adjust either s or `w hen conducting OMOs. In practice, it might be more common for central banks and @q 1 =@ `> 0; @q 2 =@ `> 0; and @u=@ `< 0.
The qualitative e¤ects of s and `o n (q 1 ; q 2 ; u) remain the same as before. When the central bank decreases the supply of bonds, the nominal interest rate decreases.
The lower interest rate induces type-2 households to hold fewer bonds and cut back consumption of q 2 . The decrease in q 2 has a negative impact on employment in the labor market, which indirectly reduces the trading opportunities of type-1 households in the goods market. Through this general equilibrium e¤ect, type-1 households also hold less money and consume less q 1 . As a result, employment further decreases. The consumption channel may sound counter-intuitive, but the essence is that if monetary policy changes returns on assets and assets are not perfect substitutes, it could a¤ect the portfolio choices by households and therefore a¤ect the macroeconomy. Such a consumption channel exists only in models where households face non-trivial portfolio choices. 9 One interesting implication from the extended model is that there exists a positive lower bound on the long-term interest rate. If the central bank keeps reducing the supply of long-term bonds by lowering `, the equilibrium eventually moves from area 2 to area 1. Then the economy is in a liquidity trap where i s = 0 and
Type-2 households are indi¤erent between money and both types of bonds. Notice that long-term bonds still earn a positive interest rate because they are less liquid than money and short-term bonds. This positive lower bound i`depends on the in ‡ation rate and the liquidity of long-term bonds. A higher in ‡ation rate (high i) or a lower liquidity (lower ) of long-term bonds leads to a higher bound.
Conclusion
We build models where money and bonds coexist to examine the e¤ects of monetary policy on macroeconomic performance such as consumption and unemployment. In the benchmark model with money and short-term government bonds, we …nd that a lower supply of government bonds can lower the short-term interest rate. The lower interest rate induces households that use bonds to reduce their consumption.
Households that do not use bonds also lower their consumption through an indirect 9 There is some empirical literature about the impacts of low interest rates during the Great Recession on household consumption and unemployment, such as Mian et al. general equilibrium e¤ect. The lower consumption by households reduces …rms'pro…ts and leads to higher unemployment in the economy. We highlight that the e¤ects of such OMOs are through a consumption channel. When the economy's short-term interest rate is close to zero, the central bank can resort to unconventional monetary policy by adjusting the long-term interest rate. By purchasing long-term government bonds, the long-term interest rate is lowered, which again leads to lower consumption and higher unemployment.
When assessing the e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, it is more common to focus on the investment channel where a lower interest rate could stimulate investment demand and output. Our model uncovers a new channel that works through consumption demand. In contrast to the e¤ects on investment, the lower interest rate has negative e¤ects of consumption and employment. We view this consumption channel as being complementary to the investment channel. It would be useful to construct models where both the consumption channel and the investment channel are present to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy.
We leave this for future research.
A Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium values of (q 1 ; q 2 ; s s ; u) are determined by (10) , (11), (15), and
where (22) is derived from (13) and
We reduce the equations system to two equations (10) and (22) to solve for (q 1 ; u), where q 2 is a function of q 1 through (15). Then q 2 is derived from (15) and s s can be derived from (11) . Taking full derivation of (10) and (22), we have
If we graph (10) and (22) on the (u; q 1 ) space, we know from (10)
It implies that (10) is downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0, q 1 is derived from i = h (1) (q 1 ), which should be a …nite number. When q ! 0, u should approach
1.
From (22), we have
which means that (22) is also downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0, H (u) approaches in…nity. It follows that q 1 should approach in…nity as well. The intersection of the two curves gives equilibrium (u; q 1 ). If monetary equilibrium exists, there is at least one solution at which (22) is steeper than (10) . If monetary equilibrium is unique or if we focus on the equilibrium with the smallest q 1 , then it must be true that (22) is steeper than (10) at the equilibrium allocation. Mathematically,
After rearranging, this exactly implies that D < 0.
We use (15) to derive
Notice that D < 0 implies that the h From (11), we have
The sign of @s s =@ s is not clear. When monetary equilibrium is unique, there is one i s for any given s . If it is also true that there is one s for any given i s , then we know that i s ( s ) must be either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
To prove that there is one s for any given i s is equivalent to prove that the solution (q 1 ; q 2 ; u) to (10), (24) and (22) When 0 = i s < i`< i, the return on short-term bonds is 0. The return on longterm bonds is positive. However, since long-term bonds are less liquid than shortterm bonds, it is not clear how type-2 households choose among money, short-term bonds and long-term bonds. Recall that for both short-term bonds and long-term bonds to be held by type-2 households, we have (19) . When i s = 0, i`must be (1 ) i= (1 + i) so that type-2 households hold both types of bonds. It follows that To understand the e¤ects of changing `, we gather the equilibrium conditions (10), (22) , (18) , and
Here (23) is derived from (31). Substitute s`from (23) into (18),
Now we use (10), (24) and (22) to solve for (q 1 ; q 2 ; u). Taking full derivation against these three equations, we have
To …nd the sign of D, we adopt the approach used in the proof of the basic model.
Instead of three equations, we reduce the system to two equations (10) and (22) 
From (10), we have dq
It means that in the (u; q 1 ) space, (10) is downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0,
, which should be a …nite number. When q ! 0, u should approach 1. From (22), we have
where dq 2 =du can be derived from (25)
We can show that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Substituting (27) into (26), we reach
It implies that in the (u; q 1 ) space, (22) is also downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0, H (u) approaches in…nity. It follows that q 1 should approach in…nity as well.
We know that both (10) and (22) are downward sloping in the (u; q) space. In addition, (22) must be above (10) at u ! 0. The intersection of the two curves gives equilibrium (u; q 1 ). If monetary equilibrium exists and is unique (or we focus on the equilibrium with the smallest q 1 ), it must be the case that (22) is steeper than (10) at the equilibrium allocation. Mathematically, it must be true that
After some algebra, one can …nd that (28) 
with `d enoting the amount of long-term bonds used by type-2 households in goods market. For a …rm, the expected trading surplus in the goods market is
In (30), newly issued long-term government bonds `( B` B` ) contributes to government's revenue and payment incurred by the outstanding long-term bonds m B`
contributes to government's expenditure.
In the goods market, type-2 households can use any assets. 
We can then derive the FOC with respect tob`as given by (18) .
In the extended model, the Friedman rule (i = 0) still achieves the e¢ cient allocation. For i > 0, di¤erent cases of monetary equilibrium exist depending on the values of (i; s ; `) . We have the following nine cases for i > 0.
(1) When `= 0 and 0
etary equilibrium is the liquidity trap case in the benchmark model. In this case,
are solved from h (u) (q 1 ) = i; h (u) (q 2 ) = 0 and (22), long-term bonds do not exist. Monetary equilibrium is the scarce bonds case in the benchmark model. In this case, 0 = i`< i s < i. type-1 households hold money and type-2 households hold long-term government bonds to trade in the goods market. It follows that g (q 2 ) = ( m+ + `+ ) b`. We gather the equilibrium conditions (10), (13) , (18) , and the market clearing condition (17) that determine equilibrium (q 1 ; q 2 ; u; s`). Notice that (17) implies that
where i`is a function of s`from (16). 
C Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that i s > 0. When (19) is satis…ed, we know that both short-term bonds and long-term bonds are held by type-2 households. It is easy to verify that i`< i i¤ i s < i. We label this type of equilibrium as scarce bonds equilibrium. When i`< This case is the same as the liquidity trap equilibrium discussed above. It follows that when i s > 0, the only equilibrium where both short-term bonds and long-term bonds are valued features 0 < i s < i`< i.
In the scarce bonds equilibrium, (q 1 ; q 2 ; s s ; s`; u) are determined by (10) , (11), (18), (22) , and (21). We derive (21) using the asset market clearing conditions. Recall that Together with g (q 1 ) = m+m and g (q 2 ) = m+bs + ( m+ + `+ ) b`, we can reach (21) . Notice that s s is determined by (11) . One can …nd s`as a function of (q 1 ; q 2 ; u) from (21) and substitute it into (18). Then we have three equations (10), (22) and
to solve for (q 1 ; q 2 ; u).
Taking full derivation against these three equations, we have It remains to …nd the sign of D. We follow the same approach as we used above to reduce the equation system to two equations. In (21), q 2 is a function of (q 1 ; s`).
Recall that s`= i 2 = 1 . We can transform (21) to
:
